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In the past twenty years, dedicated research efforts have helped us expand our knowledge of 
how the international financial system operates. Because the emergence of global finance is really 
a re-emergence, much of this research has been devoted to understanding previous regimes and 
experiences in relation to modern ones. Although matters are hardly settled and controversy is 
vibrant, there is at least now a body of literature to which we can turn. We know much more about 
the record of international debt than we did thirty years ago. In particular, we have acquired 
knowledge on: how previous bondholders have fared;
1 the incidence of collective action 
institutions on recovery rates;
2 debt crises and the volatility of bond prices;
3 contagion in the long 
run;
4 and the factors that affect a country’s reputation.
5 We have also acquired knowledge on the 
historical determinants of sovereign bond prices in secondary markets
6 and on the historical 
effects of exchange-rate regimes on credibility (or lack thereof).
7 Last, we have acquired statistical 
knowledge on the long-run evolution of government debt.
8 
One area has been relatively under-researched: the microeconomics of foreign currency 
sovereign debt issuance. Macroeconomists recognize that the workings of primary international 
capital markets are important because these markets provide countries with access to external 
funding.
9 Yet the nuts and bolts of their operation are usually neglected, save the occasional 
outburst of interest in a special feature of possible relevance to policy. A prominent example is 
earlier research on the causes and consequences of the “original sin” phenomenon.
10 The 
                                                 
1 . Eichengreen and Portes (1986); Lindert and Morton (1989). 
2 . Eichengreen and Portes (1989). 
3 . Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001), Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2006). 
4 . The most significant contributions include Bordo and Murshid (2000) and (2002), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2003), Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2002) and (2006), Neal and Weidenmier (2002), 
and Flandreau and Flores (2009). 
5 . Flandreau (2003); Tomz (2007). See also Flandreau, Gaillard and Packer (2009) for the emergence of ratings in the 
interwar. 
6 . See Flandreau, Le Cacheux and Zumer (1998) for an early contribution. Subsequent works include Flandreau and 
Zumer (2004) and Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2006). 
7 . See Bordo, Edelstein and Rockoff (1999) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004) for dissenting views. 
8 . Flandreau and Zumer (2004) for the late 19
th century and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) for longer time periods. 
9 . Eichengreen and Mody (1998); Grigorian (2003); Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2004); Fostel and Kaminsky, 
(2007). Other papers relate to (mostly descriptive) aspects of issuing costs for certain countries (see Zervos, 2004). 
10 . “Original sin” refers to the observed tendency to denominate external debt in foreign currency (see Eichengreen 
and Hausman 2005). For historical aspects of the matter, see Flandreau and Sussman (2005). 3 
 
relevance of some more arcane aspects of debt issuance has also been acknowledged; we have in 
mind studies on the effect of certain covenants (e.g., collective action clauses) on bond prices.
11 
This paper is the first to take up the issue of the operation of primary markets over the long run. 
We identify an intriguing result. Using new data on several episodes of foreign sovereign debt 
issues in leading capital markets and then arranging the output by underwriter, we find that 
defaults are today randomly distributed across underwriters. But they were not randomly 
distributed in the past, and this is what we call the default puzzle. 
Resolving the default puzzle requires that we discuss insights from banking theory. Our 
interpretation hinges on the effects of “brand” or “charter” value on intermediaries’ risk taking. In 
the past era (by which we mean the long-run period that began in the early 19
th century and ended 
with the interwar crisis), underwriters provided valuable certification services. They tried to 
secure prestige by convincing investors that their name was associated with safer products. They 
did this not for the sake of honesty, altruism, or self-esteem but rather because doing so entailed 
benefits. Today is different: underwriters have shed their role as certifiers and have outsourced it 
to rating agencies. The resulting reduction in liability risk also means that more competitive banks 
are prepared to issue riskier securities. We suggest that this new situation has given birth to a 
market for lemons, a market that did not exist in the past. We conclude that the next sovereign 
debt tsunami will crash on a foreign debt market that is by design more accident prone than its 
predecessors. Whether we will have adequate tools to handle the disaster remains to be seen. 
In support of these claims we marshal a large amount of new data. Unlike many important and 
ambitious previous works, we draw not only on published sources but on archives as well, and we 
have also performed interviews. This reliance on primary evidence (archives and interviews) is 
essential given the sometimes secretive nature of the business under study. As a result, this paper 
is the first to deal with the operation of primary markets for foreign government debt over such a 
long time span. With the help of this new evidence, we are able to test our central argument 
through a number of its implications. Among our findings, we report a change in the degree of 
concentration in the underwriting business (highly concentrated in the past, much less so now), in 
the underwriting services provided (encompassing in the past, much more limited now), on the 
fees collected (large and increasing with risks in the past, small and unresponsive to bond spreads 
now), on the quality standards applied by market leaders (high in the past, low now), on the 
                                                 
11 . See Eichengreen and Mody (2000); Gugiatti and Richards (2003) and Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2003) 
for different perspectives. cooperation between underwriters and borrowers (strong in the past, limited today), and finally on 
the quality outlook of the products brought to the market (the past did not have a large market for 
products below the Investment Grade threshold, the present does).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the data, the default 
puzzle, and a sketch of the argument; the rest of the sections provide various tests of our theory. 
Section II discusses measures of market concentration; Section III provides evidence on 
underwriting patterns and fees levied; Section IV discusses the relation between underwriters’ 
brand value and risk taking; Section V provides evidence on the link between underwriting and 
contagion; and Section VI explores the link between banker turnover and reputation. Section VII 
shows that the modern period has been characterized by the emergence of riskier debt, and 
Section VIII discusses the reasons for the regime change in the modern era. We end with 
conclusions in Section IX. 
 
Section I. The Default Puzzle 
Background and Data 
In the 19
th century, lending to foreign governments occurred through the agency of originating 
houses located in the leading financial markets of the time. Because these houses had subsidiaries 
or partners in various cities, the diffuse nature of origination was a characteristic feature of the 
business. London was the leader in that it was home to a large number of underwriters and issues, 
but Paris emerged as a serious competitor in the late 19
th century.
12 During the interwar period, the 
center of the world financial system shifted partly to New York, and government securities 
followed.
13 After an extended period of suspension—coinciding with the period between the 
interwar bonded debt collapse and the banking debt debacle of the early 1980s—the loan 
origination market has been reinvented along lines that seem to be broadly similar.
14 This 
prospering modern market relies on international securities originated and distributed by 
investment banks. The emerging markets crises of the 1990s and their boom during the period 
2002–2007 have been its latest vicissitudes. An open question at the time we are writing is the 
                                                 
12 . Jenks (1927), Landes (1958) and Gille (1965) and (1967) provide classic accounts. 
13 . Lewis (1938). Roberts (1992) describes how certain London houses opened shops in New York to remain in the 
game. 
14 . We leave out the experience with syndicated lending which was very different from present and earlier 
arrangements as it served to allocate bank debt and thus differs radically from the “originate and distribute” set up. In 
particular, this market involved international financial institutions that were all “informed” and who kept the credits 
on their books. 5 
 
resilience of foreign country debt in the wake of the subprime crisis, global recession, and high 
CDS (credit default swap) premia.  
In this paper we examine foreign government debt issued in leading financial centers in the 
past 200 years. Our database comprises issues of foreign governments’ debts since the beginning 
of the 19
th century. We look at the markets in London (1818–1914), Paris (1882–1914), and New 
York (1920–1930). We also look at the foreign government debt of “emerging” and “transition” 
countries that has been placed abroad during the present era (i.e., 1993–2007). Our data is not a 
series of samples but rather, as far as possible, the documented population of issues.
15 The 
historical material is constructed from listings of securities issued in the relevant markets and 
checked against lists found in bank archives and periodicals. The modern material includes the 
population of issues that form the background for the League Tables published by Bloomberg.
16 
One issue that arises is the comparability of emerging and transition governments over time. 
Previous research has generally brushed this issue aside, considering 19
th-century borrowers such 
as Denmark, Sweden, or Canada to be suitable counterparts to modern emerging countries.
17 Such 
an assumption may well be questioned.
18 Because colonies were actually subsovereign entities, 
they have been excluded from this study. We focus on sovereign borrowing by emerging and 
transition countries now and on sovereign borrowing in foreign currency then. On the other hand, 
strict comparability would likely have required us to add countries that are more well-behaved to 
the modern dataset. 
Our logic is market based, not fundamentals based (the latter would be quite impossible to 
implement). In other words, we compare markets with each other. First of all, to the extent that 
producers of League Tables and market participants describe the debt of emerging and transition 
countries as forming a market, it is natural to try and match it against historical counterparts. 
Previous periods did not recognize such differences and looked at the foreign currency 
government bond markets as a whole; in fact, those markets did contain predominantly the 
securities of countries without a large domestic market. Second, we noted a fair amount of 
continuity in the identity of the countries involved in various episodes (Russia in the 19
th century 
and today is an example that comes to mind). Finally, we strongly believe that our basic findings 
                                                 
15 . Appendix 1 gives description of data sources. 
16 . More precisely, we focus on securities that are taking into account for league table purposes. See Bloomberg 
Markets (2006). 
17 . See Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2006) for a study that proceeds in this spirit. 
18 .  See Accominotti et al. (2008). would be robust to the inclusion in the modern group of safer borrowers, because our key point is 
about transformations in the high-risk group, not in the low-risk group. 
The chronology that we identify does capture the six successive waves of sovereign debt issues 
that have taken place since the 1820s. Historians have shown that the first five waves were 
terminated in more or less abrupt ways: those in the early 19
th century (1818–1829), the mid-19
th 
century (1845–1876), the 1880s (1877–1895), the pre-WWI period (sometimes inappropriately 
called the “first era of globalization”), the 1920s (1920–1930), and finally the modern era (1993–
2007). Three of these waves (the 1820s, the mid-19
th century, and the interwar period) were 
terminated by massive failures, so they will receive more detailed attention. In the rest of the 
paper these periods will be referred to either in terms of the time spans just described or in 
shorthand as (respectively) “early 19
th”, “mid-19
th”, “1880s”, “pre-WWI”, “interwar”, and “now”. 
The Puzzle 
Defaulting countries are usually studied from the point of view of their characteristics or 
fundamentals, and accordingly an exciting literature has sought to relate default probabilities to 
countries’ performance.
19 Previous authors identified defaulting patterns and coined the 
expression “serial defaulters” to designate recidivists.
20 Here we suggest taking a different look. 
We bring a new dimension to the study and suggest examining defaults on the basis of 
underwriter identity. The importance of common lenders has been recognized in previous studies 
of contagion, which emphasized commonality of lending centers as a possible propagation 
mechanism. We bring the topic to a finer level and explore the relation between borrowers and 
underwriters.
21 Our first question is to ask whether defaults across underwriters can be described 
as being generated from a random draw or whether, instead, underwriters do (or did) specialize in 
certain kinds of securities.
 22 
For this purpose we compare the distribution of defaults per underwriters during the modern 
era and earlier periods. A formal criterion that is chi-square based is Cramér’s V statistic (Kendall 
and Stuart, 1979). We computed this statistic for three selected episodes of major sovereign debt 
                                                 
19 . See e.g. Goldstein, Reinhart, and Kaminsky (2000), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999), Berg and Pattillo (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998), Kaminsky (1998), Goldfajn and Valdes (1997). A recent addition to this literature is Nieto-Parra (2008) who 
shows that fees paid to underwriting banks have an explanatory power for predicting sovereign crises. 
20 . Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
21 . For empirical evidence on this argument, which has often been mentioned (see e.g. Calvo 1998), see Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (2000) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003). 
22 . A related question was considered by Mintz (1951) who emphasized heterogeneity in default rates during the 
interwar. 7 
 
distress (the 1820s, 1870s and 1920s) as well as for today;
23 the output is presented in Figure 1. 
We see that formerly there was a clustering of defaults about certain intermediaries (in the past, 
defaults were not random) but that this is no longer true today (defaults are now randomly 
distributed).
24 This intriguing result means that the identity of underwriters once provided 
information on the likelihood of future defaults but no longer does so. This is the default puzzle. 
Suggested Resolution 
Can we make sense of this puzzle? The argument we put forward builds on theoretical insights 
from banking and finance theory but also extends ideas first articulated in Flandreau and Flores 
(2009). The argument has parallels to the classic paper by Diamond (1989) on the importance of 
repeat play in sustaining credibility. Because repeat play alone cannot sustain sovereign debt, 
Flandreau and Flores (2009) additionally incorporate underwriters’ monopoly power. The 
intuition is related to Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), who develop a relevant model in which 
the financial intermediary’s reputation for veracity mitigates the moral hazard problem in 
information production. Prestigious underwriters who might be tempted to overprice securities in 
order to generate short-term gains do not actually do so, because it would damage their reputation. 
Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) show that, over the long run, issues managed by prestigious 
houses outperform those managed by ordinary ones. Also, Beatty and Ritter (1986) show that 
underwriters whose offerings underperform lose market share. Market share emerges as the 
endogenous solution to pre-commitment and credibility problems. As a result, natural monopoly 
emerges as a separating equilibrium in which quality, commitment, performance, and monopoly 
power are related to one another. 
To see how these insights provide a way to think about the default puzzle, compare two 
regimes in which there are both informed agents (intermediaries) and uninformed agents 
(investors). In the first regime, which we argue coincides with earlier times, informed 
underwriters combine liquidity provision (they help with the issue of bonds) and signaling 
services. In contrast, the functions of providing liquidity and signaling quality are separated in the 
                                                 
23 . Defaults reached close to 40% in the three episodes. They are close to 10% for the modern era. The proportion 
may rise substantially in the near future if we believe current CDS premia for some emerging countries. 
Computations by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) suggest that the selected episodes were the most violent in history. 
24 . Given the sheer difference in the size of the populations (the number of observations for the 1820=23. 1850s-
1870s=180. 1920s=124. Now=1442), straight comparison of Chi-square is not adequate. Cramér’s V controls for that 
by dividing with number of observations and tests the strength of the association between the defaults and 
intermediaries. For the 1820, Cramér's V=.93. 1850s-1870s=.73. 1920s=.69. These numbers (above .7) are 
conventionally interpreted as revealing strong association (here between default and underwriters). By contrast, we 
find Now=.20. A value between 0 to .25 is usually interpreted as indicating a non-existent to weak association. second regime, where underwriters concentrate on issuing as many bonds as they can. 
Certification has been delegated to rating agencies who provide advice to investors.  
We can readily see why the behavior of intermediaries will differ in the two regimes. The first 
regime provides an opportunity for certain underwriting banks to invest in prestige. Securing a 
reputation as a serious underwriter can become a source of rents because higher-quality securities 
have a broader market, and this fact can be used to attract the best borrowers and retain an initial 
monopoly position. We thus expect that such a regime will exhibit monopoly power, strong 
relationships between top underwriters and issuers, cherry picking by the best underwriters, and a 
tendency for lower-grade securities to have difficulty finding a market. This is because the market 
for speculative bonds is operated by those underwriters with the least ability to certify (the lemons 
problem). 
In the second regime, certification from other than underwriters does reduce revenues for the 
underwriter. If everyone knows the “true worth” of a security, then the marginal benefit of 
additional signals declines. Hence we expect financial intermediaries to compete more 
aggressively and underwriters to make more indiscriminate choices when picking securities. The 
portfolio of securities that hits the ground is thus of lower average quality than under the first 
regime. In sum, if certification has been outsourced then underwriters escape liability risks. 
Investors are now advised of the risks and are encouraged to diversify it away. The result is the 
emergence of a “market for lemons”. 
 
Section II. Market Power 
Our view that earlier regimes rested on underwriter-based certification implies that we ought to 
observe more market power in earlier periods. In Table 1, we organize some hard evidence 
regarding the degree of competition that prevailed during successive episodes. Working with the 
sources described in Appendix 1, we constructed two statistical measures of market power. The 
first measure we discuss is the Herfindahl-Hirschman (H-H) index. Recall that an index value 
below 1000 is associated with an unconcentrated market. Values between 1000 and 1800 
characterize a moderately concentrated market, and values above 1800 indicate that the market is 
highly concentrated. The second measure is the market share of the top three underwriters. 
Table 1 shows that the H-H index fluctuated over time but that the overall degree of 
concentration was typically higher during earlier periods. The highest degrees of concentration 
were in the mid-19
th-century, interwar, and late 19
th-century Paris market (close to or above 9 
 
1800). Computation for the early period (1820s) also reveals that concentration was substantial 
then (H-H index of 1667). Concentration for the 1880s and pre-WWI period was more moderate 
(values of 1200 and 1270, respectively). The lowest degree of concentration is obtained for the 
modern period (New York and London), for which indices are slightly above or below 1000 and 
have an aggregate concentration of only 842. 
After computing market shares for the top three underwriters, we find that they always 
controlled more than 50% of the market in historical time periods; the proportion is now below 
50%. Peaks correspond to the early 19
th-century (London), late 19
th-century (Paris), and interwar 
period (New York), which are all above 65%. The low ebb is observed for New York and London 
today (48% and 38%, respectively). Again, market power is substantially lower today. 
Finally, Figures 2a–2e rank underwriters’ market shares in various episodes. Striking features 
are the decline over time of the leader’s share and the reduced difference now between the leader 
and its immediate followers. In the 1820s, Rothschild had 40.8% of the amounts loaned in London 
while the next intermediary (B. A. Goldschmidt) had 23.6%. During the interwar period, JP 
Morgan held 50.8% of the New York market while the next best (National City) had 9.9%. JP 
Morgan still leads the New York market, but only with 20.8%, and the next best (Citi) is close 
behind with 15%. The market for underwriting foreign government debts was highly concentrated 
until the interwar period, but it has become much more competitive as of late. 
 
Section III. Good Girls Go to Heaven, Bad Girls Go Everywhere 
We now examine two more predictions of our theory. First, if prestigious underwriters 
formerly worried about retaining market share but do not today, then we should observe that they 
used to cherry-pick better securities and are much less discriminating today. Evidence of this is 
provided in Figures 3a and 3b. The figures compare the ex ante quality of the portfolio of 
securities underwritten by the leading intermediary with the portfolio of the other firms. Here 
“quality” is measured in terms of the distribution of spreads (evidence from ratings, when they are 
available, provides similar results). A noticeable difference between Figure 3a and Figure 3b is 
that the interwar leader specialized in higher-quality securities whereas the modern leader tends to 
issue securities of similar or lower quality than do followers. Figure 4 provides evidence of the 
average yield brought out by the “best and the rest” in a number of time periods. The figure shows 
that, until the interwar, the best always issued safer securities than the rest. The other test we consider looks at ex post results. Suppose serious underwriters make careful 
choices to protect market shares. We should expect problems (measured here by default events) to 
be concentrated within the lower end of the underwriter spectrum: less prestigious houses, which 
are also the ones with the smallest market shares.
25 A convenient tool to capture this intuition is to 
construct Lorenz curves of underwriters’ performance. Ranking intermediaries’ market shares 
from the smallest (low prestige) to the largest (high prestige) and then plotting the cumulated 
share of underwriters’ securities in default (as a percentage of the total amount in default) help 
explicate the risk taking of underwriters. To see this, we use  ) , ( k k d x  to define the pair formed by 
the amount underwritten by bank k ) ( k x  and the defaulted amount previously underwritten by 
bank k  ) ( k d . Indices k are ordered by the amount of banks’ underwriting:  
  1 . kn x xx <<<< LL  (1) 
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Finally, the Lorenz curve of underwriters’ performance is then defined by the pairs ( k X , k D ). 
Suppose that underwriters do not worry about what happens to the securities they have sold. 
Then default is random: the smallest underwriter with (say) 5% of the securities underwritten will 
have about 5% of the defaults; when combined with the next larger underwriter who has (say) 
10% of the market this will account for about 15% of the defaults, and so on. The resulting Lorenz 
curve should therefore be close to the 45° line. Now suppose that prestige does confer a larger 
market share but also requires placing only good securities (otherwise prestige will be lost). In this 
                                                 
25 . We are aware that default does not mean irrecoverable capital losses as previous research has demonstrated. Yet it 
provides a simple, straightforward way to capture the number of “problem cases” and is thus a valid indicator of 
performance. 11 
 
case, the smallest (least prestigious) underwriter with 5% of the securities underwritten will have 
much more than 5% of the defaults (say 20%). In contrast, the largest (most prestigious) 
underwriter with (say) 20% of the securities underwritten may have only 5% of the defaults. The 
resulting Lorenz curve should therefore be concave. 
To test for these possibilities, we consider four episodes (Figure 5). As before, the “past” is 
represented by the three most violent historical debt crises in history (1820s, 1844–1875, and 
1920–1930). In comparing these episodes with the modern period, we find that the former are 
associated with strongly concave Lorenz curves. This contrasts with the modern period, in which 
the Lorenz curve essentially overlaps with the 45° line. This is consistent with our view that 
default was not randomly distributed in the past because underwriters formerly made careful 
choices. 
 
Section IV. Fees and Risk Taking 
That underwriters were more heavily involved in the past than they are today should imply that, 
other things being equal, they took on more risks and required substantially larger fees than is now 
the case. To show this, we first summarize qualitative evidence obtained from our study of many 
early underwriting contracts as well as interviews with modern market participants; we then 
provide new data on the long-run evolution of underwriting fees. 
Underwriting Contracts, Past and Present 
Today, a key aspect of any international bond issue is the “agreement” between the main 
underwriter and the government. This document specifies the particulars of the issue, such as the 
bond structure. One central aspect of the agreement is the “distribution system”. In principle, 
distribution could take the form of either “best efforts” or “firm commitment”—two forms that are 
known in other segments of the capital market. Under best efforts, the intermediary pledges to help 
in the sale of bonds but does not bind itself to acquiring any if there are no other buyers. That is, a 
failed issue creates no liability. By contrast, in a “firm commitment” arrangement, the financial 
intermediary agrees to purchase all securities directly from the issuer for sale to the public and is 
liable for any unsold inventory. Interviews with market participants suggested that “best efforts” is 
the ruling pattern today.
26 
                                                 
26 . For instance JP Morgan told us “everything is best efforts, rarely a firm commitment. Best efforts is the standard” 
Moreover according to Lehman Bros, “banks would never put up capital to buy a whole deal, enough to make a firm 
underwriting. You are not really paid to take that risk today”.  In the past, the contract signed between governments and underwriters was also a central part of 
the process. We have examined many such contracts. As today, the main choice was between using 
the underwriter merely as distributor of the bond or rather also as full insurer of the issue’s success. 
The former arrangement was known as “sale on commission” and the second as “firm taking”. 
These are equivalent to the modern systems of best efforts and firm commitment: with sale on 
commission, underwriters received subscriptions for the purchase of bonds but took no liability in 
the result of the issue.
27 With firm taking, the issue was understood to be purchased from the 
government and then resold to the public. Mixed arrangements involved partial commitment with a 
portion sold on commission.
28 
The contracts that we examined indicate that firm taking became the dominant pattern over the 
19
th century, although there were periods and countries for which a greater proportion of sales on 
commission can be observed. It is fair to say that, by the end of the 19
th century, full or quasi-full 
underwriting had become the nearly absolute norm. However, there were still some exceptions. We 
found that Barings initially favored sales on commission. Testifying in 1875, one Barings 
employee drew a sharp contrast between issues where they acted as genuine “contractors” 
(underwriting the issue) and issues where they would be mere “agents” (only placing the loan in 
the market), adding that “most generally loans are issued by the firm [i.e. Barings] in London as 
agents for the Government” (Select Committee, p. 1: our italics).
29 This declaration is consistent 
with the actual Baring contracts that we could inspect. Yet over time, even Barings moved to full 
underwriting. 
The same pattern (i.e., predominance of the full underwriting contract) also prevailed during the 
interwar period. The Senate Committee hearings provide much evidence that this was the case in 
the New York market, and British bankers examined before the Macmillan Committee in 1931 
                                                 
27 . The limited role of the bank in the sale on commission is described in the following way by White (of 
Barings) examined by the Select Committee: “Q 64 : What is it that you do for that ; what is it you are bound to do for 
that commission  ? – We are bound to make all the arrangements for issuing the loan. Q 65: What sort of 
arrangements; suppose the agreement made, what do you do? – We examine all the documents, and prepare the 
prospectus, and invite subscriptions for the loan; then we issue scrip for the loan, then receive the proceeds generally 
by various instalments [sic]; and when all this is completed we receive the bonds and countersign them, and issue 
them to the public” (Select Committee, p. 3). 
28 . For a model studying the trade-off between underwriting share and commissions, see Flores (2007). 
29 . The Committee was concerned with the way information about underwriters of the loan would be conveyed to the 
market. “Will you tell me, please, would that prospectus show the contractors for the loan; assuming Messrs. Baring 
to have contracted with the Russian government, or any other Government, would their name appear as contractors 
upon the prospectus? – Yes. But in many cases loans are issued simply by the firm in London as agents for the 
Government and not as contractors for the loan. Most generally loans are issued by the firm in London as agents for 
the Government”.  At a later stage of the interview White added that he knew of only “one instance of a loan which 
has come under [his] control which was not issued on commission” (p. 2). 13 
 
also emphasized this fact. Sir Kindersley (of Lazard) made a distinction between a “bank” or mere 
distributing institution and an “issuing house” or genuine originator and underwriter, and he 
emphasized the importance of actually buying the securities it distributed. “Q. 1302. Do you buy 
up the issue yourselves? – Yes. I think that another difference between an issuing house and a bank 
is that an issuing house, not always, but I think in the majority of cases purchases the security and 
re-sells it to the public. It takes the definite risk and purchases it …. This is what generally 
happens.”
30 To use the language of Kindersley, modern intermediaries are more like “banks” than 
“issuing houses”. The prevalence of a more coercive business norm in the past is further supportive 
evidence of our central claim. 
Fees and Risk Taking 
Can we provide some numbers that support our suggestions based on qualitative evidence? 
Table 2 gives ranges for fees; sources (archival or other) are indicated in footnotes. The first two 
columns report data on fees and spreads within the subsample of securities for which we do have 
material. The ratio of fee to spread is computed for the dominant underwriting pattern (best efforts 
for the modern period and full underwriting for earlier times). The table supports the notions that 
emerged from our previous discussion. The fee/spread ratio was much higher in the past. It has 
declined significantly in recent periods, which is consistent with our finding of a more limited 
underwriting service today. 
One may worry that part of the result is driven by technological progress that makes modern 
underwriting more efficient, but we are skeptical of this objection. Most of the revenues from 
underwriting must come from the risks involved (captured by underlying volatility), which we 
control by using division by spreads. But to address this concern, Table 2 also decomposes the 
available evidence to report minimum, maximum, and average fees according to alternative 
underwriting regimes.
31 We find that earlier times’ best-efforts fees were not much different from 
modern ones (they were somewhat larger on average but did not fall outside the modern range). 
This leads us to conclude that technological progress cannot account for the decline in fees. 
                                                 
30 . Our italics. Macmillan Report, Minutes of evidence, p. 77-8. 
31 . Specifically, we have tried to identify the charges that were paid in the cases when the alternative system was 
chosen. While we have no evidence of modern contract with full underwriting, there are some cases of best effort 
contracts in the past. First we have the Barings contracts already alluded to. Next we have contracts that coincide with 
“conversions” (whereby debts were swapped against new ones with lower yields). Underwriters bore no substantial 
risk (although unhappy investors could in principle ask for a refund) but had to prepare the market, talk to investors, 
explain the particulars of the new bond, etc., somewhat like what underwriters do under “best efforts”. Another way 
to measure the value of distribution is to split when this is feasible the distribution (or placement) part from the 
underwriting contract. Instead, we explain it by the reduced scope of current underwriting services. The real 
transformation is the changeover from one business norm to another. 
Further evidence on the matter can be garnered by looking at the correlation between spreads 
and fees. Recall that, under firm commitment, the intermediary assumes all the risk of the issue 
and this risk is related to the bond’s volatility.
32 We should thus expect a stronger association 
between spreads and fees in the past than now.
33 Results are shown in Table 3: we do find 
substantially higher correlation coefficients in the past. Another test in Table 3 enables us to 
assess the significance and sensitivity of fees to spreads under different regimes. We run a simple 
ordinary least squares regression of fees on spreads, plus a constant. We find higher levels of 
significance and sensitivity, as well as higher R-Squared values, in the past. This is consistent 
with a greater pass-through of country risk into underwriting fees and, once again, indicates that 
today’s financial intermediaries take fewer risks. 
 
Section V. The Evolution of Contagion 
Another implication of our analysis is that, because their reputation is at stake, serious 
underwriters should take special care to ensure that their sponsored issues turn out well. In other 
words, the concavity of the Lorenz curve discussed earlier is a primary concern for them. There are 
various ways to test for this hypothesis. One way is to look at whether banks are involved in 
secondary markets. Brand-conscious underwriters ought to worry about excess volatility or 
contagion spilling over to “their” securities. Accordingly, they should intervene to prevent such 
events. 
  Interviews with modern bankers suggested that underwriters today offer some partial 
participation in the secondary market. However, the underwriter is typically not obliged to make a 
secondary market for the bonds, which is consistent with best-efforts contracts.
34 Underwriter 
responsibility is thus limited to placing the bonds in the market and making an effort to stabilize 
                                                 
32 . Interpreting the underwriting service for the issuer as an insurance premium, Appendix 2 shows that under firm 
commitment contracts, fees are an increasing function of spreads. 
33 . Note that recent research provides conflicting results on the modern relation between fees and yields. Amira 
(2004) finds such an association for (corporate) Eurobonds. Nieto-Parra (2008) reports weak evidence of this 
correlation for modern emerging market sovereign debt. 
34 . Consider the following excerpt from the prospectus of a Brazilian loan issued in 2004: “No assurance can be 
given as to the liquidity of the trading market for the global bonds”. Prospectus supplement of US$750,000,000. 
Federative Republic of Brazil. 10.5% Global Bonds Due 2014.  July 7, 2004. Some interviewees reported that this 
service is related to the fee paid to the underwriter and to the underwriter’s willingness to acquire a reputation as a 
good supporter, increasing the likelihood to secure future contracts 15 
 
their price in the secondary market for an unspecified duration. The underwriter is never expected 
to act as “lender of last resort” on the bonds issued by governments.
35 
In previous eras, underwriters frequently engaged in market operations to support the 
government bonds they were issuing, and these purchases went far beyond the initial issue and 
placement of the bonds. Such operations occasionally came up in the press or in parliamentary 
commissions in reference to “fictitious” operations to “inflate” bond prices, which did occur in 
some cases.
36 As a result, bankers often denied they were involved in such schemes,
37 although 
leading houses acknowledged their role as lender of last resort. Rothschild’s testimony before the 
Select Committee is an example.
38 Flandreau and Flores (2009) report evidence of massive 
purchases of Rothschild-sponsored securities during one episode of financial contagion in the 
1820s. Kahn (from the firm Kuhn and Loeb) gave testimony before the Senate Committee in 1931 
that acknowledged the existence of support purchases and added that underwriters were under 
“permanent moral liability” to make ends meet. As he stated: “we have frequently made it our 
business, a contingent part of our obligation, that if there is an undue or unjustifiable decline in 
bonds, if there is not a fair market for the bonds, we have more than once gone into the market in 
order to afford the opportunity to such people as may want to sell, or are compelled to sell, within 
the limits of proper prudence, and within the limit of our ability, for them to do so.”
39 
Table 4 reports data that bear upon this issue. Namely, we have organized figures on past and 
present markets in terms of monthly bond spreads in sterling bonds (1820s) and USD bonds (now). 
To facilitate comparisons with earlier work we use the measure of contagion proposed by Mauro et 
al. (2006), who identify sharp changes in bond spreads (defined as changes exceeding either 200 
basis points or 20%) and then look for common features of these sharp changes across countries. 
We see that jumps are more frequent today and that contagion is comparable. The next stage is to 
sort out securities issued by the underwriter with the largest market share. That is, we isolate 
Rothschild securities and JP Morgan securities from the rest. While Rothschild specialized on a 
                                                 
35 . This is unlike the underwriting services occasionally provided to emerging government bonds by multilateral 
organizations, such as the World Bank (WB) or the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) who do include 
commitments. 
36 . Members of syndicates, underwriters and brokers were said to engage in the promotion of similar bonds by 
forward market operations in order to whet the appetite of investors. This practice, called “market rigging” in the US, 
has often been frowned upon (Select Committee 1875, Jenks 1927: p. 276-8, Lysis 1908, Benston 1990). 
37 . An illustration is one Baring employee’s testimony before the Select Committee Select Committee, p. 1 ff. This 
allegation does not stand against powerful evidence from Barings’ own archive (Ziegler 1988, Flores 2004). 
38 . Select Committee, p. 267. See also Flandreau and Flores (2009). 
39 . Senate Committee, p. 135. more limited number of countries (Austria, Brazil, Naples, and Russia), JP Morgan was 
underwriting all governments in the sample. In other words, there is no such thing as “a JP Morgan 
security” or, to put it differently, the JP Morgan portfolio is essentially the market portfolio. The 
“Non-Rothschild” and “Rothschild” columns drive our story home by showing that all the 
contagion did cluster around non-Rothschild securities. This we interpret as the combined effect of 
(a) the signaling of good securities by prestigious underwriters and (b) an underwriter’s 
willingness to intervene in support of “its” securities (to prevent a decline in its reputation). We 
conclude that good intermediaries were concerned about the performance of any security they 
sponsored, and this explains why they were willing to help even in the absence of contractual 
obligations to do so. This phenomenon is entirely absent from today’s markets. Our finding may 
shed light on the evolution of contagion over the long run. 
 
Section VI. Turnover and Reputation 
Another bit of evidence can be garnered by looking at turnover. The tendency (previously 
identified) of underwriters in previous eras to band with issuers should be reflected in some 
properties of turnover rates. Consider this reasoning as applied to what we have called the “past” 
regime: good issuers benefit from association with prestigious underwriters because such 
intermediaries are prepared to support them. Of course, issuers are charged for this support (we 
found higher fees then than now). Good issuers may want to bargain for better terms, yet going to 
lesser underwriters would make investors wary. And since there are, by definition, few good 
underwriters, turnover at the top should be small. (If we consider that dropping by more than one 
notch in the underwriting scale would entail reputational costs, any turnover should be limited to 
switching between the top two firms.) On the other hand, lesser issuers have an incentive to shop 
around, because prestigious underwriters prefer not to deal with them and because the remaining 
underwriters are substitutes for one another. As a result, we should expect more turnover at the 
bottom. The implication of these remarks is that, for the “past” period, we should observe a 
positive correlation between turnover and spreads at issue, other things being equal. 
In contrast, we find the modern market to be very competitive and with all underwriters doing 
pretty much the same thing. Here the implications are that (a) average turnover ought to be more 
substantial (all issuers shop for the best price) and (b) there should not be any correlation between 
turnover and spreads. Thus we have two more testable propositions of our theory. They are 
examined in Figure 6, which correlates (by country) turnover and average spread at issue. The 17 
 
figure also permits us to locate visually the “average” turnover (between 0% and 100%). The 
periods chosen are the modern era and a longer chunk of time (London 1877–1914) than in other 
tests. This was done in order to ensure the statistical significance of turnover rates in the presence 
of less frequent market access then than now.
40  
The result in Figure 6 is striking. First of all, it is obvious that average turnover has increased 
tremendously in the modern period. Computations show an average turnover of 51% for the 
historical period against 86% for the modern one. Second, we observe a positive association 
between turnover and spreads for the historical period. There is no such association for the 
modern period, which is consistent with our predictions. 
 
Section VII. The Market for Lemons 
The last proposition we examine is as follows: if reduced asymmetries of information permit 
large underwriters to escape liability costs, then we should observe a transformation in the 
characteristics of the bonds that are issued today compared to earlier periods. Although safer 
bonds that could make it to the market then should still be around now, riskier ones that had a 
harder time in the past have become less penalized and should now feature more prominently. In 
other words: in the modern era, a market for lemons is born. 
To document this assertion, Table 5 provides basic characteristics of the population of 
government securities that made their way to the market place during different time periods. We 
outline a number of basic measures. We report the number of securities that could be identified 
and then give the number of countries that accessed the global capital market. The next columns 
list data for the minimum, maximum, and average size for the securities in the corresponding 
group and also a conversion of these amounts to 2008 USD (where we have used 
http://www.measuringworth.com/index.html to convert amounts).
41 We then report information 
on maturity and risk. Maturity is the time lag to date of redemption as stated in the initial issuing 
                                                 
40 . Turnover is measured as the sum of underwriter switches divided by the number of issues. Where there are 
multiple underwriters, if any of the underwriters from the past issue are among the underwriters for the current issue, 
we do not consider this event as a switch. Because (as the next section will show) countries used to access markets 
with longer term securities than today and thus less frequently, the interwar period with its short boom and bust 
record is not a good benchmark and we have preferred using the last two periods of the 19th century (London 
market), for which a long track record (and thus reliable turnover rates) can be constructed (1877-1914). 
41 . Conversions based on CPI. The year used is mid-period except for the first era for which 1830 was chosen. The 
Eh.Net site provides conversions for both sterling and USD. French francs were first converted in USD at the (fixed) 
exchange rate that prevailed at the time (gold standard). documentation or the press;
42 risk can be measured by looking at either yield premium at issue or 
rating at issue. Because rating agencies did not begin assessing sovereign debt until after World 
War I, this measure is available only from the interwar period onward.
43 
There are two features that emerge from Table 5. The first is the shorter maturities now than in 
earlier times. During the nineteenth century, average maturities lengthened gradually: from 31 
years (1818–1829) to 33 (1845–1876) to 47 (1877–1895) and finally to 43 (pre-WWI). At about 
the same time (1880–1914), maturities were comparable in Paris (about 50 years). The interwar 
saw a substantial decline of maturities, but they remained longer than 25 years. This contrasts 
with the recent period, for which average maturities have been halved (New York) or reduced by 
a factor of 3 (London). The modern average maturity is less than 10 years. This reduction in 
length of maturity has been noted before, but its significance has not been explained. Theory 
suggests that restricting maturity of the debt facilitates control because it gives lenders a sanction 
over borrowers (Montiel, 2003). Hence one possible interpretation of the evidence on maturities is 
that foreign debt is inherently riskier today than in the past. 
The second intriguing fact concerns the evolution of spreads. The shortening of maturities 
makes direct comparison of spreads difficult owing to upward-sloping yield curves. Broner, 
Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2004) argue that today’s emerging economies employ short-term 
borrowing because of the higher risk premium charged by international capital markets on long-
term debt. As a result, long-term debt yield premia that would prevail if countries borrowed today 
as they did in the past might be higher than what we observe. With this qualification in mind, we 
see that average spreads are at least as high today as they were in the past, implying that 
counterfactual long-term rates might be substantially higher. Spreads declined over the 19
th 
century, from 357 and 397 basis points (1820s and mid-century, respectively) to 275 (1880s) and 
215 (pre WWI); then they rose again during the 20
th century, standing at 291 in interwar New 
York and at 364 for the same market in the modern period (the average spread in London is now 
288 basis points). Similar spreads associated with substantially shorter maturities may thus be 
indicative of riskier debt. 
Another piece of interesting information is provided by average ratings, which are indicated in 
Table 5 and detailed in Figure 7. In order to enable comparisons across time periods, Figure 7 
                                                 
42 . Actual redemption could be shorter and as we already discussed it was standard practice for loans to contain 
covenants permitting reimbursement or conversion before maturity. 
43 . See Flandreau, Gaillard and Packer (2009). 19 
 
aggregates modern ratings to match earlier, coarser granularity (see Appendix 3 for details on 
mapping modern ratings to earlier ones). Figure 7 illustrates the cutoff between Investment Grade 
and Speculative Grade securities, which was already recognized in the interwar period.
44 As can 
be seen in Table 5, the average rating for foreign debt was above Investment Grade during the 
1920s (averaging A) but is now squarely within Speculative Grade (with an average of BB for 
New York and BB+ for London). In Figure 7, we see that the Speculative Grade category was 
extremely narrow during the interwar period but it is much broader today. In other words, a 
genuine liquid market for Speculative Grade government securities has arisen. In the language of 
one Alliance Capital interviewee who described the modern market: “Underwriters will 
underwrite anything, for a fee.” We argue that, in the past, reputable underwriters prevented 
riskier securities from reaching the market because of brand concerns. 
 
Section VIII. Regime Change 
This paper has outlined the contours of two successive certification regimes: the old one, which 
rested on underwriters’ signals; and the new one, where underwriters have outsourced the 
certification service to rating agencies. One pending question is why this transformation occurred: 
Why was certification outsourced to rating agencies? In this section we review a number of 
arguments that may explain why underwriters shed their earlier role as gatekeepers of the quality 
of international government securities. 
A natural explanation that comes to mind is progress in information technology. The insider 
knowledge of the “Rothschild era”—as well as the superior technology provided by pigeons, 
reliable correspondents, and so forth—would become less important in today’s world, when 
information can race across continents at nearly the speed of light. Investors now learn about 
market prices in real time. Moreover, governments today are more open and transparent and are 
also more uniform in reporting data. These factors must have played a role, yet they seem to lose 
significance in the face of the abruptness with which the regime change occurred. After all, there 
were radical changes in information technology that occurred between the 1820s and the 1920s. 
News that once took days or even weeks to reach leading markets became available in seconds. 
Although seconds have been sliced to fractions of a second since the 1920s, the marginal change 
is smaller. It is therefore unclear, if technology is what matters most, why the interwar was so 
                                                 
44 . In the interwar, the cutoff was Baa/Ba. Today it is Baa3/Ba1 (Moody’s). See Flandreau, Gaillard and Packer 
(2009). much like the early 19
th century (itself similar to the 18
th century) but so different from the 
modern era. 
Another counterargument to the technology-based explanation is that, once a signaling regime 
of the kind that prevailed in the past is in place and performs well, there are no reasons to replace 
it: incumbents see no advantage in changing the status quo, and outsiders are unable to do so. In 
other words, we expect to see a fair amount of persistence in certification regimes, quite apart 
from the strict availability of information. Supporting this conjecture, we note the persistent 
leadership of the House of Rothschild in the 19
th century (it could be displaced only when the 
market moved to New York, where Rothschild had no presence). Their leadership continued even 
as carrier pigeons were replaced by telegraph and as word of mouth was replaced by The 
Economist’s  Investors’ Monthly Manual. Similarly, Moody’s, Standard Statistics, Poor’s, and 
Fitch, all of which began rating sovereigns during the interwar period, coexisted with the “JP 
Morgan” certification regime identified previously. Still, they were unable to displace this regime. 
During the 1931–1932 U.S. Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, nobody from the 
rating agencies was asked to testify—while bankers, economists, and government statisticians 
were. When discussion centered on the measurement of “over-indebtedness”, the opinions of 
Moody’s was not sought. In other words, even when new vehicles are available to provide 
information, investors do not necessarily use them or coordinate the information from them. 
Following this line of reasoning, a possibility we believe worthy of consideration is that, once 
the current regime was put in place, underwriters could no longer be considered credible certifiers. 
Note that, between the collapse of the 1930s and the securitization of the 1980s (Brady bonds), 
there were about 50 years during which the international government debt market was a sleeping 
beauty. The accounts we have of the conditions under which this market was reawakened does 
suggest that certification by underwriters was not credible. A senior manager from Moody’s, 
sharing his memories of the 1980s, suggested that sovereign ratings had to be reinvented in a rush 
because they were critical for booking and marketing purposes. We interpret this as suggesting 
that, since the Brady bonds were designed to offload defaulted debts from the balance sheets of 
international banks, the very same banks that had already made bad choices could hardly be 
credible certifiers of government securities. Hence some other certification instrument had to be 
conceived. As a result, when the international government debt market woke up, the first thing she 
saw was a rating agency and she immediately fell in love with it. (Though, as with all couples, 
there would be crises later on.) 21 
 
The investment banks that became involved in the new market probably welcomed the 
transformation (they included reincarnations of interwar New York leaders such as JP Morgan or 
National City Bank). Fees were now smaller, of course, but liability risk was also reduced. Rating 
agencies would be the new lightning rod for accusations of financial malpractice. The banks, 
although undoubtedly informed, would now be able to show to unhappy customers the grades 
given by (possibly less informed) rating agencies. Academic economists have lent support to this 
interpretation, blaming the agencies.
45 Against the reduction of fees stood reduced maturities that 
increased the frequency of market access events, which increased revenues. In addition, the 
emergence of a new market for lemons created new opportunities by increasing the total amount 
to be underwritten. The net effect may have depended on the particulars of each specific bank, but 
we can safely suppose that, if there were profits to be made by reverting to the old regime (i.e., by 
limiting investment to select securities as a signal of one’s worth), then the industry would have 
already figured it out.  
Other factors that may have pushed in the same direction include questions of ownership and 
control in investment banks. Both British-style merchant banks and U.S.-style investment banks 
were formerly private institutions, and owners of the capital kept a close eye on the dealmakers 
(or originators). But modern investment banks are joint stock companies and thus may have a 
shorter time horizon. The agency problems created by the distribution of bonuses to investment 
bankers have naturally reinforced the need for external certification services. This explains why 
rating agencies have now become part of the regulatory and certification infrastructure, a role they 
did not play in more distant times.
46 In this context, the rise of the use of ratings and the change of 
private investment banks into listed companies are complementary transformations. It remains to 
be seen whether we are safer with underwriting and certification made by the same agent or 
instead split across various financial intermediaries. 
 
Section IX. Conclusion 
In a nutshell, we find as follows. In earlier periods, investment banks provided their customers 
at both ends (lenders and borrowers) with a vast array of services; banks acted as broker, certifier, 
                                                 
45 . Reisen and Von Maltzan (1999); Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999). 
46 . See Flandreau, Gaillard and Packer (2009) for historical details. The recent past has seen rating agencies 
becoming important agents in new bond offerings. While their participation is not strictly needed in a legal sense, 
domestic or international prudential regulation, which do rely on ratings and place limits on the purchase of unrated 
securities, make them necessary. For instance, the Basel II regulatory framework penalizes unrated securities (BIS 
2005). and lender of last resort when issues failed. Today, certification is mostly provided by rating 
agencies and so underwriting banks perform the more limited function of “making the market” for 
the issuing government. We demonstrate that a result of this transformation is considerably lower 
fees (as a share of the amount issued) now than in the past. A further implication is that 
government debt today is by construction more risky and volatile than it was in the past. 
Moreover, this debt is certified by agents who do not have direct access to the flow of soft 
information normally obtained through the underwriting and banking relationship. Instead, these 
agents must rely on published information only. Should trouble come, rating agencies have no 
means to help and no privileged information. Underwriters have no reason to provide support, 
because they have escaped liability by transferring certification duties to the rating agencies. By 
contrast, in the past, a bank as both issuer and certifier saw the wisdom of not jeopardizing its 
reputation and was often willing to serve as a lender of last resort. 
Although this evolution may have beneficial aspects (e.g., it enables high-risk countries to 
borrow when before they were “rationed out”), we speculate that it has engendered new risks. 
First, it may have weakened market discipline. Since underwriters have been able to pass on to 
others the liability of making wrong choices, they have also softened borrowing governments’ 
incentives to make adjustments when needed. Second, the degree to which the increased risk that 
is built into the system remains manageable hinges critically on the ability of investors to 
diversify. Yet no one has demonstrated that diversification is actually feasible in the face of large, 
correlated supply shocks. It is thus our contention that the current crisis is much different, and 
may actually be worse than all previous episodes. 
In a recent piece of professional self-introspection, Acemoglu (2009) writes about one of the 
several notions he felt had been destroyed by the subprime crisis: “our logic and models suggested 
that even if we could not trust individuals, particularly when information was imperfect and 
regulation lacklustre, we could trust the long-lived large firms—companies such as the Enron’s, 
the Bear Stearn’s, the Merrill Lynch’s, and the Lehman Brothers’s of this world—to monitor 
themselves and their own because they had accumulated sufficient reputation capital. Our faith in 
long-lived large organizations was shaken but still standing after the accounting scandals in Enron 
and other giants of the early 2000s. It may now have suffered the death blow.” This paper sheds 
light on why such faith was disappointed: we assumed, incorrectly, that the present would be 
much like the past. 23 
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Period Number  of 
Underwriters  
H-H Index  Market share 
Top Three (%) 
Names of To Three 
1818-1825 12  2432  73.4  Rothschild 
B.A. Goldschmidt  
Thomas Wilson 
1845-1876 45  1382  55.3  Rothschild   
Barings 
Imperial Ottoman Bank 
1877-1895 34  2176  65.5  Rothschild 
Barings 
Hambros 
1895-1913: London  33  1196  51.7   Rothschild 
Hong Kong Bank 
Barings 
1895-1914: Paris  14  1746  65.0  Rothschild 
BPPB 
Banque Impériale Ottomane 
1920-1930: New York  20  2869  68.9  JP Morgan 
National City 
Blair 
1993-2007: New York  29  1145  48.0  JP Morgan 
Citi 
Morgan Stanley 
1993-2007: London  26  876 38.6  JP  Morgan 
UBS 
Deutsche Bank 
1993-2007: All  43  842  39.4  JP Morgan 
Citi 
Deutsche Bank 
Sources: See Appendix 1.  
  
Table 2. The Evolution of Underwriting Fees in the Very Long Run 








Firm Commitment  Best Efforts 
Period  Min  Max  Average  Min  Max  Average 
1818-1829 : London  8.3  2.8  3.6  16.1  8.3  1 5.2  3.7 
1845-1876 : London  6.1  1.9  1.5  13.1  6.1  1 2  1.8 
1877-1895 : London  4.4  1.7  1.3  12.4  4.4  0.3 3 1.83 
1896-1914: London  4.9  2.7  1.0  8.2  4.9  1 2.75  2.18 
1896-1914: Paris  4.1  3.8  1.6  9.1  4.1  n.a. n.a.  1.5 
1920-1930: NYSE  5.0  1.7  1.1  15.2  5.0  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1993-2007: NYSE  0.54  0.15  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.02  2.75  0.54 
1993-2007: London  0.76  0.26 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.04  3  0.76 
1993-2007 : All  0.84  0.25 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.02  3.37  0.84 
Sources: Authors’ computations. Fees : Ziegler (1988), Select Committee (1875), Amaral (1984) Dawson (1990), 
Dritsas (1993), Anuario Estadistico (1927), Gille (1973), Flores (2004), Suzuki (1994), US Congress (1932). Archive: 
Rothschild Archives, ING Baring Archives, HSBC Archives, Crédit Lyonnais Archive, Guildhall Library. Spread at 
issue from sources described in data appendix. Benchmark risk free rates: London, NBER macrodatabase (before 





Table 3. Fees and Spreads (Firm Taking) 
Period  R-squared  Fee=a+b*spread 
(t statistics) 
H0 : Significance 
of spread (at 5%) 
1818-1829 : London  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1845-1876 : London  0.56  Fee = 3.421+0.65*spread 
                 (3.17)     (2.75)  Accept 
1877-1895 : London  0.43  Fee =  -1.843  +   2.492*spread 
                (-1.1)          (4.0)  Accept 
1896-1913: London  0.41  Fee =  1.9535  +   1.479*spread 
                (3.1)          (5.0)  Accept 
1896-1913: Paris  0.65  Fee = 1.658 +  1.513*spread 
                (8.53)       (5.85)  Accept 
1920-1930: NYSE  0.32  Fee = 0.62475 + 1.497* spread 
                  (1.00)      (7.24)  Accept 
1993-2007: NYSE  0.0002  Fee =  0.55642  +   0.004*spread 
(10.56)          (0.27)  Reject 
1993-2007: London  0.027     Fee = 0.59129 + 0.052*spread 
(7.5)          (2.2)  Accept 
1993-2007 : All  0.003      Fee = 0.8014 + 0.017*spread 
(12.6)      (1.29)  Reject 
Sources: Same as in Table 2. 
Note: Sovereign bond spreads (spread) and fees are in percent.  
 
 Table 4. Clusters of contagion 
 PAST 
 14 countries, 1822:3-1829:12 
PRESENT 
1994:11-2004 :2 
  Total  Non-Rothschild  Rothschild  Total & JP Morgan 
  200 b. pts  20%  200 b. pts  20%  200 b. pts  20%  200 b. pts  20% 
Sharp Changes  
% of  Obs. 
5.83  4.54  10.5 7.6  0  2.5 13.2 12.9 
% Months without 
Sharp Changes 
37.2  51.1  37.2 45.7 100  90.4 43.2 44.1 
Sharp Changes in 
one Country 
20.2  26.6  20.2 25.5  0  8.5  30.6 34.2 
Sharp Changes in 
Two Countries 
16.0  11.7  16.0 11.7  0  0  15.3  7.2 
Sharp Changes in 
Three or More 
26.6  10.6  26.6 8.5  0  1.1 10.8 14.4 
Sharp Changes in 
Two or More 
42.6 22.3  32.6  20.2  0  1.1 26.1 21.6 
Contagion Ratio *  67.8  45.6  67.8 44.2  0  11.1 46.0 38.7 
Sources: Past: Authors’ computations from Wetenhall (see Flandreau and Flores (2009) for details). Present: Mauro et al. (2006) : 
p. 115. The 14 countries for the past are Argentina (Buenos Aires), Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greek, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Naples, Peru, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spanish. The 8 countries for the Present are: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Poland, Venezuela. Because of missing observations, we may slightly under estimate the extent to which there were 
sharp changes. 




Table 5. The characteristics of emerging market debt 
Sources: Authors’ database, see Appendix 1. 
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Source: Authors’ computations35 
 
Figure 2a: Ranking of top 10 underwriters by market share (percentage), 1818-1829 
 
 
Figure 2b: Ranking of top 10 underwriters by market share (percentage), 1845-1876 
 
 
Figure 2c: Ranking of top 10 underwriters by market share (percentage), 1877-1895 
 Figure 2d: Ranking of top 10 underwriters by market share (percentage), 1920-1930 
 
 
Figure 2e: Ranking of top 10 underwriters by market share (percentage), NY 1993-2007 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ database, see Appendix 1. 
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Spread ranges (in bps)























Spread ranges (in bps)
JP Morgan All other underwriters
 
 
Sources: Authors’ database, see Appendix 1. Figure 4. Risk Taking: Leaders and Followers  
 













Figure 5. Lorenz curves: 3 debt crises (1820s, 1840s-70s, 1920s) vs. today 
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Figure 6b. Turnover and spreads: Late 19
th century 
 














Sources: Authors’ database, see Appendix 1. 41 
 
Figure 7. Percent. Investment Grade and Speculative Grade Securities 























Sources: Authors’ database, see Appendix 1 and Appendix 3. Appendix 1. Data 
Historical sample 
Data on the characteristics of financial instruments were collected using traditional London 
sources such as Fortune’s Epitome, the Reports of Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Burdett’s 
Stock Market Official Intelligence, London Stock Exchange Official Intelligence and the financial 
press (The Economist and its supplement, the Investors’ Monthly Manual) and The Times. For 
Paris, we relied on the Annuaire Officiel des Agents de Change (1882-1914).
47 For New York, we 
have relied on the Manuals by Moody’s, Fitch and Poor’s as well as on the US Senate Committee 
on Finance Hearings on the Sale of Foreign Bonds published 1932. Data on defaults are obtained 
from these sources. 
Modern period 
The now period (1993-2007) is covered using DCM Analytics, the fixed income product of 
Dealogic (global coverage of the debt capital markets), an investors and financial intermediaries 
service. It is described in Nieto-Parra (2008). For defaults, we combined a dataset for sovereign 
default on foreign debt provided by Moody’s (2008) and a useful database from Sturzenegger and 
Zettelmeyer (2005), which we matched against the Dealogic population of issues.
48 
Fees 
Apart from occasional mentions in the contemporary press or in secondary sources indicated in 
sources for tables, material on fees does not exist for the early periods. It was entirely constructed 
from archives. The patience of archivists from Rothschild, ING-Baring (Baring Brothers), HSBC 
(Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation), and the Guildhall library (Hambro, and London 
Stock Exchange Archive), BNP-Paribas (Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas), Crédit Agricole 
(Crédit Lyonnais), the Centre d’Archives du Monde du Travail (Rothschild frères, Banque 
Impériale Ottomane), is gratefully acknowledged for they allowed us to open literally hundreds of 
boxes in search for original contracts. 
Regarding the interwar period, fees have been previously published by Lewis (1938), 
Kuczinski (1932). Both have worked with, and somewhat interpreted, the evidence in the four 
                                                 
47 . It covers securities sold in the official market where most government securities were transacted. 
48 . Database available at http://profesores.utdt.edu/~fsturzen/Publications.htm.  To make sure that we were not losing 
out any of the many bonds defaulted upon by Argentina in 2001 (Porzecanski, 2005), we also considered 
(www.mecon.gov.ar/finanzas/download/anexo_comunicado_prensa.pdf) a database provided by the Ministry of 
Finance of Argentina as well as material provided by the Argentine Bond Restructuring Agency (available at 
www.hypovereinsbank.de/media/pdf/Wertpapierliste.pdf). 43 
 
volumes US Senate Committee on Finance Hearings on the Sale of Foreign Bonds. We went back 
to this source. Finally, fees for modern times are available in Dealogic’s Bondware. 
Bond prices. 
Bond price series used in section V are the same as in Flandreau and Flores (2009). They 
provide a detailed description of the material. Appendix 2. Spreads and fees 
In this appendix, we discuss factors that determine the fee collected by an underwriter in the 
event of full underwriting. Our goal is to demonstrate that fees are an increasing function of risk 
and thus, since spreads measure risk, of spreads. For this purpose, we consider a government 
facing an underwriting industry that is made of competitive, risk neutral, firms. We call  p the 
“shadow” price that would be expected to prevail on the issue date if the issue was taking place 
directly on the market. The shadow price may be thought of as an indicator of liquidity. An 
adverse liquidity shock on the day of the issue would force the government to sell the bond at a 
discount, while a favorable one would yield a premium. Calling u  a random shock with a uniform 
distribution  −a,a []  such that Eu () = 0 (with 0 ≤ a ≤1), we write without loss of generality: 
p =1+u , 
The problem at hand is to determine, given the issue price  pE , the price at which the 
underwriting syndicate purchases the bond from the government or  pA = pA pE,a () . Suppose that 
at the date of the issue the shadow price is above the issue price. Then investors will want to 
subscribe the bond and the issue is entirely sold to the market. The bank having purchased the 
bond from the government at  pA  resells it to the public at  pE  and makes a gain of  pE − pA  per 
share. If by contrast the shadow price is below the issue price, nobody will want to purchase the 
bond and the bank makes either a gain or a loss, depending on the sign of  p− pA. Because of the 
risk of losing money if the issue turns awry, the bank will only accept to buy the bond from the 
government at a price that is sufficiently low so that the gains in the favorable states of nature 
compensate the losses incurred in unfavorable ones.
49 
In this setting, two critical assumptions help determine  pA . First, risk neutrality ensures that a 
bank is happy with a compensation that is just equal to the average loss she expects to make in 
unfavorable states of nature. Second, the competitive structure of the industry ensures that she will 
not ask for a higher compensation than the one that offsets its expected losses (otherwise the 
government will turn to another bank). 
                                                 
49 . For simplicity, we consider that a shadow price exactly equal to the issue price means a success. In practice, 
transaction costs, as agents have to switch from identical assets to purchase the new one, imply that the issue will only 
succeed if the issue price is marginally below the shadow price so that investors are compensated for the expenses 
they face in reallocation their portfolio. Transaction costs are frequently mentioned as being the reason why there is 
today an “IPO” discount, i.e. that new bonds are on average sold marginally below the price at which similar assets 
are traded (ref?). This question being of second order compared to what we deal with here, we abstract from it. 45 
 







A if −a ≤ u < pE −1. The expected gain G  from underwriting the 


































The zero profit condition tying  pE  and  pA  together, given a, is thus: 
pE − pA () ⋅ a− pE +1 () +
1
2
⋅ pE −1 ()
2 −a
2 {} + 1− pA () ⋅ pE −1+a () {} = 0 
This equation determines  pA  as an implicit function of  pE . In a more general approach, it 
would be interesting to treat  pE  as endogenous as well and derive both prices as model solutions. 
However, since the basic property considered here obtains for any  pE  it is just as good to focus 
on the determination of  pA  only. For simplicity, therefore, and in line with the discussion above 
we assume that the underwriting syndicate marks the issue to market and sets the issue price at the 






















This shows that the larger the variance of the expected liquidity shock on the market for bond i 
(or identically the more volatile the price of bond i), the larger the “haircut” that a competitive risk 
neutral bank will require in order to underwrite the issue of that bond. If volatility is maximum 
(a
i =1) banks only accept government bonds at 75% of their issue price the issue. By contrast, if 
there is no volatility (a
i = 0 ) banks take the bonds from the government at the very price at which 
they resell them to the public and the underwriting fee is zero. The important point here is that the 
fee charged for full underwriting must be an increasing function of the risk of the bond.  Appendix 3. Keys for Granularity 






























Source: Authors, from Moody’s Manuals. 
 
 
 